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With cumulative innovation and imperfect information about the value of innovations, intellectual 
property rights can result in hold-up and therefore it may be better not to have them. Extending the 
basic cumulative innovation model to include 'sampling' by second-stage firms, we find that the 
lower the cost of sampling, or the larger the differential between high and low value second-stage 
innovations, the more likely it is that a regime without intellectual property rights will be preferable. 
Thus, technological change which reduces the cost of encountering and trialling new 'ideas' implies 
a reduction in the socially optimal level of rights such as patents and copyright. 
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Introduction
[The] 90-minute documentary [Wanderlust] ... was also a 
window into the frustrations of making a clip-intensive film 
dependent on copyright clearance, which has become 
hugely expensive in the past decade. Initial quotations for 
the necessary sequences came to more than $450,000, 
which would have raised by half the cost of the IFC film. ... 
"Paramount wanted $20,000 for 119 seconds of 'Paper 
Moon,' " Ms. Sams said. "The studios are so afraid of 
exploitation that they set boundaries no one will cross. Even 
after the prices were cut, we were $150,000 in the hole."
The New York Times, May 28, 2006 No Free Samples for 
Documentaries: Seeking Film Clips With the Fair-Use 
Doctrine.
Cumulative innovation and creativity, whereby new work build upon old, is a 
pervasive phenomenon. However it was not until recently that it received 
significant attention in the literature. The seminal paper in this regard is that 
of Green and Scotchmer (1995). They introduced a two-stage innovation 
model in which the second innovation is enabled by, or builds upon, the first. 
Their paper primarily concerns itself with how rents are divided between 
innovators at the two stages, in particular with the extent to which the first 
innovator is (under-)compensated for her contribution (the option value) to 
the second innovation. They investigate how different policy levers related 
to intellectual property rights, in particular breadth1, could be used to affect 
the bargaining (or its absence) between different innovators and hence the 
resulting payoffs.
A central feature of their model, as well as subsequent work that extended 
it, was an assumption that knowledge of costs and returns, whether 
deterministic or stochastic, was shared equally by innovators at different 
stages (i.e. was common knowledge). With common knowledge all mutually 
beneficial transactions are concluded, using ex ante licenses where 
necessary to avoid the possibility of hold-up of second-stage innovators.
However this assumption is problematic. If all innovators share the same 
information why do we need different innovators at first and second stages 
and why concern ourselves with licenses and bargaining if a single 
innovator could just as easily do it all? The obvious answer is that this 
assumption is wrong, something suggested by a cursory observation of 3
reality: many different firms engage in innovation precisely because they 
have specialized skills and knowledge that make it effective for them rather 
than another firm to engage in a given area. This contention is backed up by 
empirical data and substantial anecdotal2 evidence. For example, Anand 
and Khanna (2000) demonstrate that most licensing agreements are 
concluded ex post and not ex ante (for example, in the computer and 
electronic industries, which are well known for the cumulativeness of their 
innovation, ex ante agreements account for only 5 or 6% of all agreements).
Thus, in this paper we investigate cumulative innovation under asymmetric 
information, that is, for example, where the first-stage innovator only has a 
probabilistic prior over the second-stage innovator's cost/values but the 
second-stage innovator knows them precisely3. This allows us to 
investigate hold-up: a situation whereby second-stage innovations are 
held-up (prevented or delayed) by the first-stage innovator. In such 
circumstances the policy choice, in its crudest form, is between having 
intellectual property rights (patents or copyright) available to first-stage 
innovators (which second-stage innovators infringe and therefore must 
license) and not having intellectual property rights (second-stage innovators 
do not infringe and therefore may do what they wish).
This approach adds another dimension to the question of how profit is 
divided between innovators at different stages. Seen in this light, it also has 
direct analogies with existing results related to the question of whether 
second-stage innovations should be infringing (I) or non-infringing (NI). For 
example, Green and Scotchmer consider explicitly the situation where the 
value of the second innovation is only known in terms of a probability 
distribution and show that in such circumstances 'breadth' should be finite. 
This corresponds to at least some second-stage innovations being 
non-infringing. Denicolo (2000) extends Green and Scotchmer's model with 
patent races at each stage and finds that in some circumstances it will be 
better to make second-stage innovations non-infringing (in this model one 
trades off faster second-stage innovation with non-infringement against 
faster first-stage innovation when there is infringement).
A model much closer to the basic one presented here is provided by
Bessen (2004). His paper also considers hold-up of second-stage products
or innovations by first-stage innovators. However in his model the focus is
primarily on whether ex ante or ex post licensing occurs. He assumes that
ex post royalty shares are determined exogenously – perhaps as a policy
variable or determined by invent-around costs and other factors – and
shows that the socially optimal ex post royalty share is less than that
obtained in ex ante bargaining. Here we take a more explicit approach that
allows us to determine optimal policy as a direct function of fundamental
parameters such as the probability of an innovation being of a high or low
value type.4
The second model presented extends the first by introducing the idea of 
sampling, whereby second-stage firms can sample first-stage innovations 
before deciding which to use (and therefore license). Sampling benefits a 
firm by increasing the probability of having a high value innovation but is 
costly. We find that, in general, the lower the sampling costs or the larger 
the differential between high and low value second-stage innovationsi, the 
more likely it is that a regime without intellectual property rights will be 
preferable. Thus, in the context of this model, technological change which 
reduces the cost of encountering and trialling new 'ideas' should imply a 
reduction in the socially optimal level of intellectual property rights such as 
patents and copyright.5
A Two-Stage Model of Cumulative Innovation
The Model
We adopt a simple model of two stage innovation in which the second
innovation builds upon the first in some manner – either as an application or
as an extension of it. The model, which is specified in detail below, can be
summarized in the following diagram:
Figure 1: Game Tree Post First-Stage Innovator Investment. Note that, 
for simplicity, the initial nodes at which Nature determines value type of 
first-stage firms and first-stage firms make their investment decisions have 
been omitted.6
Action and Payoff Matrix Assuming First-Stage Innovator Invests
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Innovations are described by their net value v (revenue minus costs). 
Because our interest lies in examining the trade-off between innovation at 
different stages we make no distinction between social and private value 
(i.e. there are no deadweight losses) and v may be taken to be either.
We assume the base (first) innovation takes two values: low (vL
0) and high (
vH
0) with probability q, (1 - q) respectively. We assume that vL
0 < 0 so that 
without some additional source of revenue, for example from licensing (see 
below), the innovation will not be produced. Applications Second stage 
innovations also take two values: low (vL) and high (vH) with probability 
p, (1 - p) respectively. While the value of a second-stage innovation is 
known to the innovator who produces it, the value is not known to the 
owner of the first-stage innovation which it builds upon (this could occur 
because of imperfect information regarding revenue, costs or both). Without 
loss of generality we shall assume that the number (or measure) of 
second-stage innovations per first-stage innovation is one (having N 
second-stage innovations per first-stage innovation would just require 
replacing vH with NvH and vL with NvL).
Intellectual Property Rights and Licensing
We wish to consider two regimes: one with intellectual property rights (IP) 
and one without (NIP). With intellectual property rights every second-stage 
innovator will require a license from the relevant first-stage innovator in 
order to market her product, while without intellectual property rights she 
may market freely without payment or licence4.
We assume that the direct returns to the first innovator (v0) are unaffected 
by the intellectual property rights regime. While this may appear to be a 7
strong assumption, our focus in this paper is on the division of rents 
between first and second-stage innovators and we therefore believe that 
little is lost by this simplification (there is further discussion of this in the 
paper's conclusion).
We take the licence to define a lump-sum royalty payment r and we assume 
that when royalty income is forthcoming it is sufficient to ensure that all 
first-stage innovations are produced (i.e. r > - vL
0).
Sequence of Actions
The sequence of actions in the model is:
Nature determines value type of first-stage innovator 1.
A first-stage innovator decide whether to invest. If the first-stage
innovator does not invest the game ends and all payoffs are zero. 
Assuming the first-stage innovator invests the game continues.
2.
The first-stage innovator sets the royalty rate (if there are no
intellectual property rights then the royalty rate is 0)
3.
Nature determines value type of a second-stage innovator 4.
Given this royalty rate second stage firms decide whether to invest 5.
Payoffs are realized 6.
Solving the Model




Proposition 1: With intellectual property rights the game defined above has 
the following unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. A second-stage 
innovator invests if and only if its realized value is greater than or equal to 
the royalty rate (i.e. net profits are non-negative). A first-stage innovator 
invests and sets a low royalty rate (RL), rL = vL if the probability of a low 
value innovation (p) is greater than α and a high royalty rate (RH) rH = vH
otherwise.
Proof: a second-stage innovator of type X faces a payoff of vX - r if she 
invests and 0 if she does not. Thus, a second-stage innovator, seeking to 
maximize profits will invest if and only if vX ≥ r.
Given this the first-stage innovator faces a straightforward selection/pooling 
problem with a choice between a low royalty rate rL = vL (all second-stage 
innovations produced) or a high royalty rate rH = vH (only high value 
second-stage innovations produced) with all other possible royalty rates 8
yielding a lower payoff. In the first case the payoff is rL while in the second it 
is (1 - p)rH. Thus a low royalty rate should be chosen if and only if 
(assuming that if payoffs are equal a low royalty is chosen):




Finally a first-stage innovator will always choose to invest because in the 
presence of royalty income net profits are (assumed above) to be 
non-negative. QED.
Proposition 2: without intellectual property rights the game above has the 
following solution: both types of second-stage innovators invest but of 
first-stage innovators only those that have 'high-value' innovations invest 
(there are 1- q of these type).
Proof: trivial.
Welfare
To determine welfare we need to know the 'trade-off' between first and 
second-stage innovations that occurs when revenue is allocated from one 
to the other by licensing. As stated above, without revenue from 
second-stage innovations a proportion q of first-stage innovations are not 
produced. We have assumed that when royalty income is forthcoming it is 
sufficient to ensure that all first-stage innovations are produced (i.e. r > vL
0). 
Thus in the absence of royalty income there are q first-stage innovations 
that are not produced, and these have average value vL
0. The remaining 
innovations (1- q) are produced irrespective of whether royalty revenue is 
received and have average value vH
0.
Let us now consider social welfare in the four possible situations given by 
(IP, RL), (IP, RH), (NIP, RL), (IP,RH) as well as the difference in welfare 
between an intellectual property regime and a no intellectual property regime 
(IP-NIP). Due to our earlier assumption welfare is determined by calculating 
total net value. Define for convenience v0 = qvL
0 +(1 - q)vH
0, the average 
first-stage innovator costs (if all innovate), and v = pvL +(1 - p)vH, the 
average second-stage innovator costs (if all innovate). We can then 
summarize the welfare situation in the following table:9
RL RH
IP v0 +v v0 +(1 - p)(vH)
NIP (1 - q)JvH
0 + vN (1 - q)JvH
0 +vN
IP - NIP qJvL
0 +rLN +q(v - rL) ≥ 0 qJvL
0 +(1 - p)vHN - (1 - q)pvL
Policy Implications
Proposition 3: when a low royalty will be set (p ≥ α) i.e. low value 
innovations are sufficiently frequent and/or the difference between low and 
high value innovations is sufficiently small) a patenting regime is optimal.
Proof: in the low royalty (RL) situation all second-stage innovations will be 
produced whether there is IP or not. In that case one wishes to maximize 
returns to the first innovator and patents do this by transferring rents via 
licensing. Formally in the low royalty case the welfare difference between 
patents and no patents (IP-NIP) is:
qJvL
0 +rLN + q(v - rL)
Both of the terms in brackets are positive implying that the intellectual 
property regime delivers higher welfare than the no intellectual property 
(NIP) regime. QED.
The situation when the high royalty will be set is less clear. First define β as 
the proportion of the total royalty payment ((1- p)rH) that would be 'used up' 






0 is negative and must be less in absolute terms than the royalty 
received (1- p)rH as we are assuming that the royalty enables low value 
first-stage innovators to produce. Under this definition β = 1 corresponds to 
all the royalty being used up to fund first-stage innovators higher costs while 
β ≈ 0 means all of the royalty payment is being retained as extra profits 
(and welfare).
Proposition 4: when a high royalty will be set (p < α) an intellectual 
property regime will be preferable to a no intellectual property (NIP) regime if 
and only if (NB: in fact with equality one would be indifferent):10
q ≥
pvL
(1 - β)(1 - p)vH + pvL
=
Hold-up Loss
Net Surplus Under Licensing +Hold-up Loss
 
Proof: From the table above an IP regime yields higher welfare than an NIP 
regime if and only if:
qJvL
0 +(1 - p)vHN ≥ (1 - q)pvL 
Making q the subject of this inequality and using β we obtain the stated 
result. QED.
We can represent this result graphically as follows:
Figure 2: A diagram showing optimal policy regions as a function of the 
exogenous probabilities of a low value first-stage innovation (q) or a low 
value second-stage innovation (p). α equals 0.7 so the right of the line 
p = 0.7 there is a low royalty (RL) and an IP regime is optimal. To the left of 
that line we have shown three different 'horizontal' lines which show the 
cutoff between IP being optimal (above the line) and NIP being optimal 
(below the line). The horizontal lines correspond (in ascending order) to β
equal to 0, 0.5, and 0.99.
Remarks: in the high royalty case (RH) p is the proportion of second-stage 
innovations that do not occur with intellectual property rights (due to high 11
royalties and the resulting hold-up) while q is the proportion of first-stage 
innovations that do not occur without intellectual property rights. As 
first-stage innovations enable second stage ones when we lose a 
first-stage innovation we lose all dependent second stage ones as well. Due 
to this, when β is low for no intellectual property rights to be preferable p
must be substantially higher than q. It is only then that the cost of intellectual 
property rights, in terms of lost second-stage innovations, will outweigh the 
gains in terms of more first-stage (and dependent second-stage) 
innovations.
As β increases the area in which no intellectual property rights are 
preferable will increase, with the line separating the two regions moving 
upwards. In the limit as β tends to 1 – which corresponds to most royalty
income being used by a low value first-stage innovator to pay costs – the
marginal q tends to 1, that is it is optimal to have intellectual property rights 
only if all first-stage innovations are of a low value type.12
Cumulative Innovation with Sampling Costs
Introduction
This model extends the previous by the introduction of sampling by second
stage firms. In this situation second stage firms can only use first-stage
innovations that they have encountered by some form of costly sampling
(for example purchasing a good that embodies the innovation). The more
products they sample, the more likely it is a second stage firm comes up
with a good idea of its own – which is modelled, in this case, by the firm's
innovation being of high, rather than of low, value.
Obvious real-world examples of such a situation would be software and 
music. In software a new application will likely combine many ideas (and 
even code) from previous products. But ideas can only come from 
applications that one has encountered (note that for re-use of code that 
means access to the source so the software must be open-source). In 
music, particularly modern music, re-use either explicit or implicit is 
ubiquitous. For example, in dance and hip-hop, 'sampling', whereby a small 
section of a previous work is directly copied and then repeated or reworked 
in some manner, is the very basis of the genre. More generally all 
composers whether classical or modern use previous musical, ideas, 
motifs, and melodies as parts of new works5.
The Model
The model is exactly the same as the basic one except for the addition of 
an initial period in which sampling by second stage firms takes place. The 
level of sampling then influences whether the second-stage innovation is of 
high or low value. Define the following variables:
k, the number of stage 1 products stage 2 firms choose to sample 
(via purchase, observation etc)
1.
τ the cost of each sample 2.
As before there are two types of stage 2 firms, high and low value:
vH, vL
3.
p(k), probability of being a low value firm given that k products are 
sampled. Naturally p
'
≤ 0 (otherwise no benefit of observing). We also 
assume diminishing returns for sampling so that p
''
≥ 0 and that if no 
sampling takes place all firms are of low value type (p(0) = 1). The 
functional form p(k) is assumed to be common knowledge.
4.
r, the lump-sum royalty rate set by stage 1 firms 5.
N, the number of potential stage 2 firms 6.13
The sequence of actions here is the same as in the original model except 
for the fact that we now have two options as to when the royalty can be set: 
either after or before sampling (but as in the original model still before the 
second-stage innovators take their investment decision). We shall refer to 
these two cases as royalty-after-sampling and royalty-before-sampling. 
Here we will confine our attention to royalty-after sampling6. The sequence 
of decisions in that case is shown in the following diagram:
Figure 3: Game Tree Post First Stage Innovator Investment. Note that, 
for simplicity, the initial nodes at which Nature determines value type of first 
stage firms and first-stage firms make their investment decisions have been 
omitted.14
Action and Payoff Matrix Assuming First-Stage Innovator Invests
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Solving the Model
Define the constant kα as the sampling level such that p(kα) = α where α is 










Proposition 5: With intellectual property rights (IP) The perfect Bayesian 
equilibria7 of the game where second-stage innovators play pure strategies 
are as follows:
First-stage innovator both types of innovator invest and set the royalty 






                 
                 
rH k > kα
rL k < kα
mixed strategy (rL, rH) with prob (xα, 1 - xα) k = kα
Where:15




Second-stage innovators: a second-stage innovator will invest if and only 
if the realized value of her innovation is greater than the royalty rate (note 
that even with a mixed strategy by the first-stage innovator the 
second-stage innovator knows the royalty rate with certainty at the point of 





      
      
k2 k2 < kα
kα k2 ≥ kα
Proof: We are restricting to the case where second-stage innovators 
choose pure strategies (allowing mixed strategies yields similar results but 
complicates the algebra). We will solve for a subgame perfect nash 
equilibrium by recursing backwards through the game.
1. Second-stage innovator's investment strategies: Just as in the 
original model second-stage innovator's move with full knowledge of all 
variables. In this case an innovator of type X invests if and only if net profits 
from investing, vX - r - kτ are greater than -kτ the payoff from not investing 
(sampling costs are sunk). Hence the investment strategies are the same 
as in the basic model: a second-stage innovator invests if and only if vX ≥ r.
2. Royalty levels: Using subgame perfection we can focus purely on the 
post sampling stage of the game. From the point of view of the first 
stage-innovator the payoffs and model are exactly as in our basic model. 
Let G(r) be the cumulative distribution function over royalties representing 











Maximizing with respect to G(r) immediately gives that, just as for the basic 
model, an optimal mixed strategy can only consist of some combination of 
the pure strategy rL = vL and the pure strategy rH = vH. Let us suppose that 
these two pure strategies are played these with probability x, 1 - x. Revenue 
from royalties is then:
rL(1 - x) +(1 - p(k))rHx = rL + xɾ((1 - p(k))rH - rL) 
Maximizing revenue requires x = 0 if the term in brackets is less than zero, 
x = 1 if the term in brackets is greater than 0, and allows any value of x if the 
term in brackets is zero. By the definition of kα (see above) these 16
conditions correspond to the sampling level being less than, greater than or 
equal to kα. Thus the first-stage innovator's royalty strategy as a function of 






                 
                 
rH k > kα
rL k < kα
mixed strategy (rL, rH) with prob (x, 1 - x) k = kα
3. Sampling level: Recall that second staget innovators are playing pure 
strategies. Payoffs as a function of the two possible royalty level are as 
follows:
Payoff for Second Stage Innovator
RL RH
Π(k) = p(k)(v - rL - cH - kτ) +(1 - p(k))(v - rL - cL - kτ) = - kτ+(1 - p(k))(vH - vL) -kτ
Suppose the first-stage innovator use only a high royalty rate (RH) – and so
must believe that k > kα. Then it is clear that the second-stage innovator's 
best response is to set k = 0 for otherwise she is guaranteed to lose money 
(-kτ).
Suppose then that the first-stage innovator chose only a low royalty level
(RL) – and so must believe that k < kα. Then the second-stage innovators 
best response is the sampling level that maximizes profits. The first order 
condition Π





The solution of this equation was defined above to be k2. (Remark on the 
first order condition: here both firms engage in production and the effect of 
sampling will be on the cost type, i.e. it will not effect the royalty paid or 
whether a firm invests. Hence the sampling level will be chosen so that the 
marginal gain in terms of lower costs, p
'(k)(vH - vL), equals the marginal 
sampling costs, τ.)
Now if k2 > kα then this level of sampling is inconsistent with the first-stage 
innovator's beliefs and so cannot be an equilibrium strategy. In fact because 
of the consistency of beliefs no equilibrium strategy can involve having 
k > kα. However if k2 ≤ kα we have a pure strategy equilibrium with the 
second-stage innovator playing k2.17
Suppose now that k2 > kα. From what we have just shown it is only possible 
to have an equilibrium in this case if the first-stage innovator plays a mixed 
strategy where the low royalty is played with probability x. This in turn is 
possible if and only if first-stage innovator believes the second-stage 
innovator is sampling at level kα.
For this to be an equilibrium we require kα to be a best response to the 
first-stage innovator's mixed strategy, i.e. kα must maximize expected 
profits. Thus we must show the existence of mixed strategy (x) for 
first-stage innovators such that kα is optimal for second-stage innovators. 
Profits in this case are given by:
xp(k) ɾ - kτ +(1 - x)(1 - p(k))(- kτ+ vH - vL) = - kτ +(1 - x)(1 - p(k)(vH - vL) 




(1 - x)(vH - vL)
 
Since p
' < 0 we have, denoting k(x) as the solution of this as a function of x, 
that k
'(x) < 0. Since k(0) = k2 > kα and that as x ˠ 1 the RHS of the above 
takes arbitrarily large negative values, by the intermediate value theorem 
there must exist a unique xα ˥ (0, 1) such that k(xα) = kα.
First-stage innovators investment strategy: finally as with our basic 
model first-stage innovators of both types invest because with royalty 
income net profits will be non-negative.
QED.
Welfare
For the calculation of welfare we proceed as in the original model. A 
proportion q of first-stage innovations are low value (vL
0 < 0) and only occur 
when there is royalty income. Analogously to the basic model define 
v
0 = qvL
0 + (1 - q)vH
0 and v(k) = - kτ +(1 - p(k))vH + p(k)vL (the value 
generated by a second-stage innovator sampling at level k). Further define 
v(α) = v(kα), v(2) = v(k2). Then the level of welfare, both with and without 
intellectual property, as well as the net difference between the two regimes, 
can be summarized in the following table:18
Total Welfare











-k2τ+(1 - p(k2))(vH - vL) -kατ+(1 - xα)(1 - p(kα))(vH - vL)
Welfare (IP) v
0 +v(2) v










0 +rLN +(v(k2) - rL)N S
Where S is given by:
S = qvL
0 +v(α) - (1 - q)(v(2) - xα p(kα)vL 
Proposition 6: When k2 < kα it is optimal to have an IP regime.
Proof: analogously to the low royalty case in the basic model in this 
situation all second-stage innovators invest so there is no hold-up from 
having intellectual property. At the same time, intellectual property allows 
some first-stage innovators to engage in production who wouldn't be able to 
do so otherwise. Formally in this case the welfare difference between the IP 
and NIP regime is:
qJJvL
0 +rLN + (v(k2) - rL)N
Both the first term (by the assumption that the royalty is sufficient to allow 
production) and the second (since second-stage innovators are making 
non-negative profits) are positive. Hence the sum is positive and welfare is 
higher with intellectual property.
Proposition 7: If k2 ≥ kα then it is optimal to have an IP regime as opposed 
to a no IP (NIP) regime if and only if:
q ≥ q
m ˹
(v(2) - v(α))+ xαp(kα)vL




Proof: An IP regime is optimal compared to a no IP (NIP) if and only if S ≥ 0
(assume that with a tie we choose the IP regime). Some rearranging yields:
S = qJv(2) + vL
0
N - (v(2) - v(α) - xα p(kα)vL 




(v(2) - v(α))+ xαp(kα)vL




m has been defined as the probability of a low value first-stage 
innovation which leaves one indifferent between having and not having 
intellectual property rights. QED.
Remark: In words q
m can be be written as:
q
m ˹
Benefit of Higher Sampling w/o IP+Hold-up Cost
Benefit of Higher Sampling w/o IP +Hold-up Cost+ Net Surplus under Licensing
Policy Implications
From our calculations of welfare it follows that we should choose to have 
intellectual property rights if k2 ≤ kα or if k2 > kα and q ≥ q
m.
Now q
m increases in k2 and decreases in kα. Thus the policy choice is 
directly related to the relative sizes of these different sampling levels.
What can we say about these two values as a function of the underlying 
parameters? Recall that the probability of a low value innovation goes down 
with sampling (p
' ≤ 0) but at a diminishing rate (p











Reducing sampling costs, τ, increases the level of optimal sampling 
k2 but leaves kα unaffected.
Increasing the advantage of high value over low value innovations (
vH - vL) increases the optimal level of sampling, k2, but reduces kα the 
sampling level at which a high royalty is charged. Intuitively: if the 
differential between high and low value second-stage innovations is 20
larger, then the net change in revenue for a first-stage innovator's 
from switching to a high royalty rate must increase (loss of royalty 
revenue from low-value second-stage innovations is lower relative to 
royalty from high-value second-stage innovations). Hence, the 
proportion of high value second-stage innovations (1- p(k)) at which 
the switch to a high royalty rate is made is smaller.
Increasing the value of a second-stage innovation, v, while leaving all 
other parameters constant increases kα but leaves the optimal level 
of sampling unchanged (the intuition is exactly the same as for the 
previous item).
These results suggest the following, corresponding, conclusions for policy:
Reducing sampling costs make it more likely that a freer (no
intellectual property rights) regime will be optimal. This is because the 
'optimal' level of sampling (k2) will be sufficiently greater than the 
restricted level of sampling (kα). This in turn means that having 
intellectual property rights results in a combined loss from hold-up of 
second stage products (xα ɾ p(kα)) and lower average value of 
second-stage innovations which outweighs the benefits of more first 
stage (and dependent second-stage) innovations (when compared 
with not having intellectual property rights).
1.
Increasing the differential between high and low value second-stage
innovations (which could be interpreted as sampling becoming more 
important for product quality) makes it more likely that a freer (no 
intellectual property rights) regime will be optimal. Conversely 
increasing the value of an innovation while leaving value differentials 
constant (which also corresponds to value differentials being less 
important) makes it more likely that an intellectual property rights 
regime will be optimal.
2.21
Conclusion
In this paper we have examined how asymmetric information about the 
value of follow-on innovations, combined with intellectual property rights 
such as patents, can result in hold-up. Presenting the policy decision as a 
choice between having or not having intellectual property rights, we have 
shown that, in contrast to parts of the previous literature, in some 
circumstances it may be optimal not to have intellectual property rights. For 
whilst intellectual property rights help transfer income from second-stage to 
first-stage innovators they can also lead to hold-up with a resulting 
reduction in second-stage innovation.
In the first, and simpler, model presented, our results were summarized in a 
plot showing optimal policy as a function of the fundamental variables (the 
probabilities of high or low value innovations occurring at the two different 
innovation stages). The introduction of intellectual property rights in this 
model has two basic effects. On the one hand, there are the benefits of 
increased first-stage innovation as revenue is transferred to first-stage 
innovators. On the other hand, there are costs in terms of fewer 
second-stage innovations due to hold-up. In some circumstances the 
benefits will exceed the costs and we should have (stronger) intellectual 
property rights. In other cases they will not and we should have weaker (or 
no) intellectual property rights. In particular, we have shown that, if the 
probability of a low value second-stage innovation was high enough (but not 
too high), compared to the probability of a low value first-stage innovation, 
then a regime without intellectual property rights would be preferable.
Next, we extended this basic model by introducing 'sampling'. Focusing on 
the case of royalty-after-sampling we demonstrated the existence of an 
equilibrium. The major result here was that the presence of intellectual 
property rights may restrict the level of sampling below what would be 
socially optimal. Therefore, in addition to the basic trade-off mentioned 
above between more first-stage innovations and fewer second-stage ones, 
there is the additional factor that those second-stage innovations, which 
occur under an intellectual property rights regime, have lower average 
value due to a lower level of sampling. Examining this trade-off, we find that 
the lower the cost of sampling and the greater the differential between the 
low and high values of second-stage innovations, the more likely it is that a 
regime without intellectual property rights will be preferable.
Thus, technological change which reduces the cost of encountering and 
trialling new 'ideas' should imply a reduction in the socially optimal level of 
intellectual property rights such as patents and copyright. A perfect case of 
such technological change in recent years can be found in the rapid 
advances in computers and communications. These advances have, for 22
example, dramatically reduced the cost of accessing and re-using cultural 
material, such as music and film, as well as greatly increasing the number 
of 'ideas' that a software developer can encounter and trial.
Finally, we should emphasize that there remains plentiful scope to improve 
and extend the present paper. For instance, it was assumed that 
non-licensing income (v) for the first-stage innovator was unaffected by the 
intellectual property rights regime. However this is unlikely to be the case 
and the model could be improved by the inclusion of the direct effect of no 
intellectual property rights on the revenue of the first-stage (and 
second-stage) innovator9.
It would also be useful to extend the analysis to the case of a continuous 
distribution of innovation values, as well as to investigate the consequences 
of making sampling costs a function of the intellectual property rights 
regime. It would also be valuable to examine what occurs when the 
structure of innovation is more complex, for example by having 
second-stage inventions incorporate many first-stage innovations (a 
componentized model) or having heterogeneity across innovations with 
some developments used more than others. Finally, one of the most 
important extensions would be to properly integrate transaction costs into 
the analysis. Transaction costs relating to both the acquisition of information 
and the execution of contracts are significant and without them we lack a 
key element for the furtherance of our understanding of the process of 
innovation both in this model and in general.23
Endnotes
A monopoly right (intellectual property right) such as a patent or a
copyright confers the right to exclude not simply direct copies but 
also products that are sufficiently similar. The term lagging/leading 
breath are often used to denote the space of inferior/superior 
(respectively) products that are excluded by the patent/copyright (i.e. 
taken as infringing the monopoly). ↩
1.
See e.g. Eisenberg (1998), Hall (2001), Cockburn (2005).↩ 2.
Of course, for consistency, the collective distribution of the
values/costs of all second-stage innovators should correspond to the 
prior of the first innovator.↩
3.
Given that we are dealing with cumulative innovation some readers
might prefer the infringing (I) vs. non-infringing (NI) dichotomy with its 
implication of a distinction between 'horizontal' imitation and 'vertical' 
improvement of a product. However there are two reasons to prefer 
having a simple choice of intellectual property rights vs. no intellectual 
property rights. First in practice the difference between 'vertical' and 
'horizontal' changes to products is not always obvious and the 
monopoly afforded by the IP right operates equally against the 
makers of both types of changes. Second, and relatedly from a policy 
makers point of view, breadth and/or height are not easily legislated 
(and are usually under the control of an external administrative body 
such as the patent office) while the choice between granting and not 
granting monopoly protection is clear. Witness, for example, the 
recent debate over 'software' patents in Europe, or the continuing 
difficulties in altering patent office (or judicial) norms experienced in 
the US once the patentability of software and business methods was 
accepted. ↩
4.
See e.g. Malcolm Gladwell, The New Yorker, 2004-11-22, Something 
Borrowed: Should a charge of plagiarism ruin your life?, also 
http://www.low-life.fsnet.co.uk/copyright/part3.htm#copyrightinfringement
for information about sampling in dance and hip-hop music. ↩
5.
The author has also examined the royalty-before-sampling but the
situation is considerably more complex and yields fewer insights for 
policy. In the interests of brevity it has therefore been omitted. The 
interested reader who wishes to have the details is invited to contact 
the author.↩
6.
We should distinguish between two possibilities regarding knowledge
of the sampling level available to first-stage innovators. In the first 
case the first-stage innovator does observe the sampling level. In the 
second case the first-stage innovator does not know the sampling 
level. In what follows we focus on the case where the sampling level 
is unobserved though the results are little changed when it is 
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observed. ↩
The second order condition, Π
''
≤ 0, is easily checked: 
Π
'' = - p
''(k)(vH - vL) ≤ 0 since, by assumption, p
''(k) ≥ 0. ↩
8.
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